This article is a response to “A Vision for a Lean, Political, and Effective Executive Committee” to address some concerns being raised about the Local Democracy Commission (LDC)’s majority bylaws proposal.
The LDC met over two and a half months to collaborate on creating new bylaws for the chapter. We spent much of our time on non-Executive Committee (EC) fixes, such as standardizing chapter formations and allowing amendments to bylaws changes. I am very proud of these consensus reforms, and I consider those changes alone to have made the LDC worthwhile. Reforming the EC was a small but important part of the LDC’s work after the issue was raised at the last GCM.
This original EC reform proposal was drafted over four months and introduced at two separate general chapter meetings, with input solicited from across the chapter, including every member of the EC. The proposal won 57% of the vote, just 16 votes shy of the needed two-thirds majority. Several speakers against the proposal said they were voting no so they could see what the recently chartered LDC would propose at the subsequent Chapter Convention in June. The others were centered around a lack of a labor representative and a lack of branch representatives. It is unsurprising, then, that we ended up with a similar proposal with one key addition – the Labor Coordinator. The LDC considered methods of adding branch representatives, but the majority ultimately decided that adding them was too unwieldy.
The case for EC reform was laid out in Comrade Deana C’s article published ahead of the March 2026 GCM. I recommend reading it first for context.
The Data
The first thing one sees when looking at the data is that Chicago has not done well. Out of the 16 chapters that the LDC analyzed, we’ve had the second lowest recruitment rate and worst net increase in membership. There are other things to look at than just our total numbers, but they don’t paint a better picture. Our active membership rate is more or less the same 1:5 ratio every chapter has. “Membership commitment” is monthly dues payers plus solidarity dues payers, which we are solidly average on. Both are numbers proportional to chapter membership, so lower membership means a lower number of active and committed members. It is clear that what we are currently doing is not working. Change is needed.
Our comrades writing the amendment to the LDC proposal claim that 14 to 17 members was a common and reasonable range for EC size. I would like to counter that claim with the data itself. Of the 16 chapters we studied, only 2 chapters were within this range, and only one was above it – Chicago. This four-year weighted average doesn’t take into account change in chapter EC size. For example, Detroit cut their EC size in half partway through the dataset, and almost all of their growth is from that latter half, but here it is represented as a middling amount of growth for their now 11-member EC. Looking at just the top five performing chapters, we get an average of 11.8 members. If you look at just the top five Huge chapters, you get 12.6. The numbers of high-performing chapters are much more in line with the base proposal’s 12 members than the amendment’s 16. The amendment would give us the second-largest EC of all 16 chapters studied, with only Philadelphia being larger, and even then Philadelphia only grew larger this year as their EC grows with chapter size.
Addressing Siloing
Another concern raised by the amendment’s authors was that the base proposal could lead to siloing in the branches or overworking branch leadership. I believe this fear is unfounded.
Looking at other chapters, voting representation for branches is a rare position. Atlanta, Portland, Twin Cities, Denver, Metro DC, LA, Seattle, and East Bay all have branches without voting representation. Philadelphia and North New Jersey are the only studied chapters with any form of branch representation, and even there it is limited to suburban branches, but they do not divide the core of their territory into branches with representation. The other five chapters studied don’t have territorial branches at all. This amendment to the LDC proposal, then, is suggesting something not done in any comparable chapter, and none of those chapters have had a disastrous break between their EC and branches.
There are other methods of reducing siloing. I have been a major advocate for moving more chapter work to the territorial branches, but it should be understood that that is not where most members do their work. As a branch SC member, I see far more new members than deeply involved members showing up at our branch meetings. Members commit themselves to committees and working groups, with each branch having a small group of activists who have chosen to primarily do branch organizing. Over the next year, the branches may absorb more members as they take on local electoral work under the Elecgtoral Working Group’s 2027 plan. According to the plan, members in the working group or committee act as branch organizers. The Byron Sigcho-Lopez campaign, which has had branch liaisons on its Steering Committee, has also been organizing branch-specific canvasses. This does not rely on overburdening the branch SC members, and keeps the work attached to the chapter formations.
I believe we should continue moving work to the branches in this way. As we do, territorial branches will become the least siloed bodies in the chapter, as they have more active, on-the-ground work with other chapter formations than any other group does. This is a much more effective method of reducing siloing than the amendment’s suggestion of a top-down connection with the EC through branch delegates.
The Executive Committee Takes Political Leadership
It is true that the EC is not a legislature; the GCMs are. However, there are only four GCMs a year, and every GCM this past year referred at least one proposal to the EC. This means that for members, they are relying on the EC to take political leadership.
Since the EC necessarily takes political leadership for the chapter, it must be representative of the chapter membership. The amended proposal would give one delegate per branch; this means a branch of 200 members gets five times the voting power of a branch with 1,000 members. This is akin to recreating the United States Senate, which DSA rightfully decries as undemocratic.
The amendment’s authors argue that the Labor Branch needs a delegate on their SC to liaise with leadership as a voting EC member. The Labor Coordinator in the LDC proposal already does this.The amendment gives a seat on the EC to every “institutional branch” (see Article VII, Section 3 of the proposed bylaws) elected exclusively by members of that branch. Few would contend that the Political Educator Coordinator should be elected by just Poli Ed members or that the Membership Engagement Coordinator should be elected by just the Membership Engagement Committee. Having a seat elected only by one specific body reduces buy-in from the rest of the chapter and contributes to, rather than combatting, siloing.
Our chapter’s labor work – like all of its work – is not the domain of just the Labor Branch, but the whole chapter collectively. A Labor Coordinator elected by the chapter as a whole contributes to tying the important work the Labor Branch does back into the rest of our chapter rather than isolating it. Labor work is one of the most important functions of DSA. Uniquely cutting it off from the rest of our membership is a disservice to their work and the chapter as a whole.
Another concern raised by the comrades amending the LDC proposal is that the EC risks becoming too factional. On the contrary, a more political EC and more politicized chapter is a progression in chapter democracy. Politicization increases and elevates political questions which can be debated openly and resolved rather than papered over. It also reduces siloing between working bodies, as members from each organize in factions, they communicate ideas and work together. A politicized chapter is only disorganizing if those disagreeing become hostile to each other. Having a variety of ideological groups on the EC, invested in working together, can actually reduce this issue.
The Steering Committee of the Executive Committee
Like the current bylaws, the LDC proposal does not explicitly create a Steering Committee for the EC. By remaining silent on the question, the base proposal allows chapter leadership and membership to be flexible without unnecessary proscriptions. If leaders or members feel it is necessary to establish a smaller body, they may do so within the limits and with the composition that suits the needs of the moment.
The amendment to the LDC proposal explicitly enshrines a Steering Committee in the bylaws with set powers and composition. It empowers it and overly confines it. Their Steering Committee would not include the Treasurer, which is a necessity on any leadership body overseeing spending. This year’s Steering Committee has authorized thousands of dollars in spending. It would be irresponsible to authorize a body to approve that level of spending without the Treasurer’s expert input on the budget and liability issues. I fear a Steering Committee without one could authorize over-spending or get the chapter into legal trouble without that consultation. It is also possible we could become too cautious, and wait on any budget requests to the next EC meeting or GCM that could be up to a month away.
Under the amendment, the chapter’s EC meets eight months out of the year and the SC meets every month. It allows the SC to count meetings of the EC towards their required monthly meetings only if a majority of its members are present. These dual quorum rules create a situation where the SC may have to meet twice a month if its quorum was not satisfied at that month’s EC meeting.
The two body problem also creates a level of uncertainty at the top of our chapter structures. While the EC has the power to override the decisions of the smaller SC, they cannot do so until they meet again at least a month later. While this power exists it may be hard to exercise in certain cases. While the EC can technically overturn an SC decision at their next meeting, a lot can be done in a month. Money will be spent, posts will be posted, and events hosted. The dual structure, despite giving the EC supremacy, leaves room for people with contentious proposals to shop bodies to get the more favorable outcome. The simplest solution is the one nearly every other chapter has, a single executive body which meets monthly and has no proscriptions on how it may delegate its authority other than what membership may impose on it. The base LDC proposal creates exactly such a body.
Conclusion
The original LDC proposal’s EC structure is a collaboration over the course of half a year, a scientific process of studying other chapters to see what works and what has not worked here. The LDC proposal itself had many compromises, with others losing out on specific proposals but choosing to support the package as a whole for the sake of consensus. Should the minority LDC amendment pass, we are concerned that it will create an undemocratic and needlessly complicated structure that hampers our chapter organizing.
I urge membership to vote against any amendment to the LDC proposal that changes its EC structure. However, even if the amendment passes, I encourage members to vote yes on the final resolution. Not passing anything would result in a disastrously large 30 person EC which would devour hundreds of hours from more than a dozen of our best organizers over the course of the term.
