At the upcoming Chicago Democratic Socialists of America chapter convention on June 6, members will debate a proposed rewrite of our chapter’s bylaws. This proposal was the product of the Local Democracy Commission (LDC), an appointed body of seven members tasked with developing a comprehensive consensus package of structural reforms to improve the day-to-day operations of our chapter.
Our commission was able to agree on the vast majority of changes to the bylaws, and made substantive improvements and clarifications that we all believe will greatly benefit the chapter. But the commissioners had some substantial disagreements on how to structure the Executive Committee (EC). A majority of the commissioners supported a near-identical version of the proposal which was brought forward at the March General Chapter Meeting (GCM) and failed to secure the two-thirds majority of votes needed to adopt a change to the bylaws. We’re happy that the LDC was able to agree on so much, but we think the membership should have the option to choose between the two visions for the chapter’s executive leadership.
Our concerns aren’t solely structural: we see the makeup of the EC as a fundamental political and organizing question as well, and we feel a few key changes are still needed to maintain structural connections between the membership and leadership, help the leadership move the membership behind chapter priorities, and limit the potential for siloing. So, in keeping with the guidelines set during the establishment of the LDC, we’re proposing an amendment to address these concerns.
Our Proposal
Currently, the EC is composed of eight officers and proportional representation from the territorial branches, as well as a Labor Branch delegate and a YDSA delegate. As the chapter has grown, so has the EC; the body is set to have roughly 30 members in June. Our existing bylaws also include a provision that empowers the EC to appoint a Steering Committee (SC) to handle many of the day-to-day issues that require leadership attention but don’t call for substantive debate, such as small expenses or approvals of minor requests from chapter groups. Any decision made by the SC can be overturned or revised by a vote of the full EC.
The proposal that was submitted at the March GCM reduced the EC to 11 members by eliminating all branch representation, and removing the voting authority of the Political Education Coordinator, among others. The base proposal also did not formalize an SC to handle day-to-day administrative decisions within the executive body. The main substantive difference between the March GCM proposal and the one introduced by the commissioners who supported it was the inclusion of a seat for a “labor coordinator” elected by the entire membership, rather than a delegate elected by the Labor Branch, in the way all other branch delegate seats are currently elected. We felt this change did not substantively address the concerns that members had with the earlier versions of the proposal, and did not move far enough from the failed March proposal to seek consensus and compromise with the concerns then expressed.
We agree with the other commissioners that, because the demands of executive-level leadership can lead to burnout, a much smaller executive body is needed to allow for sustainable middle-layer organizational development. But we need a political leadership that is present across the chapter, can move an all-volunteer membership through organic connections, can coordinate operational units, and, critically, has an incentive to build consensus.
We believe that by removing branch delegates and not formalizing an SC, the base proposal actually risks working against these interests. On the contrary, that structure would likely create a greater burden for EC members, sever the point of connection between branch-level leadership and the central executive body, and set up potentially adversarial relationships between the executive leadership and the branches.
Our alternative proposal reduces the EC by about 50% from its projected June size, down to 16 seats. This EC would still include an SC composed of seven members — the two Co-Chairs, Secretary, and four “at-large” members without specific officer duties elected by the full membership — to free up valuable organizing capacity for EC members and open up more space at EC meetings for political discussion. Its minimum 4-vote threshold keeps it in line with the minimum vote threshold of the base proposal, which has a quorum of 6 for the 12-person EC.
Ten of the 16 EC members would be elected by the full membership of the chapter: two Co-Chairs, Secretary, Treasurer, Membership Engagement Coordinator, and Political Education Coordinator, and the four at-large members. Other officer-level positions, such as Communications and Campaigns, could be opened up to the membership or appointed from among the EC’s elected at-large members, as the EC or GCM decides. The four territorial branches and the institutional branches (e.g., the Labor Branch) would each have one delegate, as would YDSA.
Ten generally-elected members and six branch delegates ensures a structural majority for generally elected members. The territorial branch delegates would be elected by the membership of the branch and would have a seat on the branch steering committee. The Labor Branch delegate would be elected by the Labor Branch members, and the YDSA delegate would be elected by local YDSA chapters.
Our Reasoning
This proposal addresses the major pain points members raised in our outreach as commissioners: that branch leadership should be able to focus primarily on branch work; that generally elected members should hold the majority of elected seats; that we need a nimble body to handle day-to-day administrative and political decisions; and that the executive body should have fewer seats to encourage more competitive elections.
As part of our work, members of the LDC looked at the structures of similar-sized chapters with high recruitment and retention statistics. The 16-member EC in our proposal is in line with three high-performing chapters in our tier of membership size: Portland DSA (the most successful chapter at recruitment and retention outside of New York City) has 14 seats; Twin Cities DSA had between 14 and 17 seats until February 2026 (including branch and labor delegates); and Philadelphia DSA has approximately 15. There are other well-performing chapters with smaller bodies, but Portland, Twin Cities, and Philadelphia were the best-performing in recruitment and retention. (See Tables 1 and 2 for more context on these figures; “LQR Rate” is the rate of “lapsers and quitters minus reactivators,” a metric that essentially reflects member attrition.) Portland in particular has had much recent electoral and labor organizing successes.
However, there is an important caveat: we do not believe that success follows from structure itself. As the tables below show, there is not a strong correlation between things like EC size, proportion of at-large members, or number of officers, and different metrics of success. What we found, however, was that of the most quantitatively successful chapters we identified, 14-17 was a common and reasonable range.
Certain elements of our EC’s composition have significant impact on the organizational health and functioning of the entire chapter, and we want to state those stakes clearly.
Branches Matter!
This is a belief we share with the other commissioners, who have argued that branch delegates should be removed from the EC to free them up to focus on the work of expanding branch-level organizing. While we don’t disagree with the spirit of that argument, we’ve instead proposed that each branch be given one delegate seat on the EC to maintain a formal connection between each branch and the central leadership body.
We believe that direct connection between branches and the EC is necessary to avoid siloing or pushing branch leadership to take on even more work to stay abreast of developments across the chapter and in leadership. Labor Branch already has this setup within the current EC: One dedicated delegate is tasked with liaising between the branch and the leadership as a voting EC member with substantive input, while the rest of their SC dedicates its organizing efforts towards branch and chapter work. This has been an effective model, and we believe it will serve the chapter’s operations well.
The EC is Not a Legislature—The GCMs Are
We see the function of chapter leaders elected to the EC not as representatives who advocate on behalf of a constituency, but as leaders who facilitate the work of the chapter by being embedded in it. The EC is not a legislature—that’s the GCM. Rather, it is a body delegated to efficiently execute the will of the membership between GCMs.
What’s more, the high rate of member turnover means that, at any given time, a significant portion of the membership aren’t connected to its leaders and didn’t vote in the most recent leadership election. In a typical year, 18-25% of members lapse or quit, while 15-25% of the chapter consists of new members recruited that year — meaning roughly 35-50% of the membership composition turns over annually, presenting major operational challenges for even the strongest chapters.
Conclusion
Should this amendment fail, we are concerned that the EC will become disconnected from chapter formations, sitting above them and overly factionalized in the way similar structures in other chapters have been prone to factional domination. There is also a real risk of this structure creating an adversarial relationship between leadership and membership, with an EC that is factionally proportional but not set up to implement the inherent compromises that emerge from GCM decisions, in part because it will not be composed of operational units. Most importantly, we are concerned that without this amendment, the EC may drift from its practical leadership function and begin to act more as a policy-making body detached from the membership.
In developing this amendment, we’ve prioritized a scientific approach, drawing from recruitment and retention data from comparable chapters, our own chapter’s recruitment and retention data over time, an analysis of the purpose of an executive executory body versus a legislative body, and a practical study of how members become organically connected to the central leadership. We believe this proposal is a balanced compromise between the original proposal that failed at the March GCM and what we have seen work in Chicago and comparable chapters. Our proposed amendment addresses the consensus complaints with our current structure, while holding the chapter together at the highest level. We hope the membership will agree, and consider voting in support of our amendment.
Additional Findings
For members’ convenience and reference, here are some additional data that we put together in the course of our research. There was more, but less relevant here.
Table: Metric 1. This shows the membership density of “Huge” and “Extra-Large” DSA chapters based on members per 1,000 residents in their territory. Most chapters are within range of each other; there are local factors that are important (such as geographic spread) and contextual politics is likely heavily determinative of this figure.
Table: Metric 2. This is a simple table showing the percentage of members in a chapter who either pay monthly dues or are enrolled in Solidarity/Income-Based Dues (SIBD), a measure of commitment intensity.
