As a matter of survival, socialists need to move past models from professionally-managed organizations that focus on campaigns and trainings, and think about long-term organization building through the transformation and empowerment of members.
The Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now or ACORN was an Alinskyite organization that at its height in the early 2000s had something like 150,000 member families, just about all of them poor, and the majority of them Black and Latino. They boasted the ability to “activate” people in more than 700 communities across the United States. In 2009-10, as a result of a bogus scandal based on a fabricated video, ACORN collapsed in the matter of a year or so. While various chapters survived in different forms under different names, they are a shadow of what ACORN was.
ACORN fell because it was not resilient or durable under intense pressure, not because of the scandal itself. The organization knew they had a target on their back. Attacks from the right and center were not a surprise. But because that attack undercut the leadership of a fundamentally top-down organization, the absence of member democracy made the organization easier to knock over.
ACORN provides lessons. Many are positive, like their dedication to organizing some of the poorest workers, often in Black and brown communities. Their downfall teaches us a lot by negative example.
Over time, ACORN’s non-ideological, very locally focused and staff-heavy community organizing relied on more and more grant funding. This meant they had to show results on a grant cycle. That consistently nudged them towards mobilizing more than organizing. To show numbers, more than to politically empower and transform members into political actors. Eventually their policy campaigns had their members acting more like public relations than political leadership. But a truly mass movement is owned by its participants. That’s why it can’t be decapitated easily. It is not one that will be prone to being co-opted by funding and institutional jobs.
Emma Tai touches indirectly on the problem of professional campaign-focused “mobilizing” models in a recent essay in Convergence. Tai makes a broad case against “anti-politics,” and the role of “professional democratizers” — organizers with movement jobs — in building the movements we need to resist and ultimately defeat the right. Tai’s essay is a welcome contribution to the discussion on this point. As one of the architects of Chicago’s United Working Families, Tai can fuse both theoretical understanding with deep and broad experience in local politics and organization building.
Tai’s experience prompts her to ask a series of questions that get to the heart of what building a truly democratic movement organization means: “How many dues-paying members does an organization have? What decision-making power do they have? Do they elect their own leaders? Do they vote on a platform or political endorsements? Do they move with discipline once that vote is cast[]?” The questions about dues-paying (i.e., direct) members and their decision-making rights is of particular interest, particularly given the historical models NGOs and unions have pursued when building coalition-style movement organizations: where organizations join a coalition institutionally but have little incentive to have their own members join directly, that leaves decision-making in the hands of movement professionals or parochial leaders concerned only with the narrow interests of their own organization. This dynamic alienates members from that umbrella group, undercuts the unity of action Tai asks about, and leaves coalitions prone to infighting between leadership groups. It is why political advocacy coalitions or “networks” so rarely, if ever, amount to more than the sum of their parts.
The problem Tai is grappling with is essentially the problem of movement bosses–of the fact that “the left” generally has drifted towards undemocratic and top-down models that treat democracy with hostility. Democracy is hard, sometimes chaotic, and — crucially — sometimes binds leaders to decisions they don’t personally agree with. That phenomena isn’t unique just to just political advocacy NGOs but also pervades many of the most influential unions. The logic of NGOs has pervaded and become the logic of left organizations and that has created a strata of professionals who step in and “absorb” working class self activity at its critical moments.
It is the problem with which many of even the most successful movement organizations and coalitions have found themselves struggling. Self-reflecting, two early leaders of the Sunrise Movement, the climate-action youth organization, talk about some of the contradictions and internal tensions that arose as a result of their structure and organizing approach. One thing that shows through is the distinction between “staff” “core” and “volunteers.” These three groupings are discussed as being at odds with each other at a few different points throughout the essay.
As the mass movements of the early and mid 20th century have faded out of living memory, “mobilization” has been treated more and more as the same as “people power.” That assumes that numbers alone are proof that a movement is “mass.”
We know that numbers aren’t enough. “Mobilizing” large numbers of people is not equal to a movement, especially when that mobilization needs little decision-making or commitment from participants. Hundreds of millions of people vote in elections; millions of people respond to fund-raising texts from Democrats; millions fill out auto-generated emails to Congress. These individual acts accumulated do not mean a movement.
At the same time, we know that “democracy” in the abstract is no guarantee of revolutionary, radical, or even progressive politics. European far-right parties have used referenda to stoke xenophobia and confused nationalism. “A lot of people voting” does not guarantee a progressive result. No; there is a much more challenging and interesting relationship at work.
Mass movements have to be democratic so they’re not easily knocked over. So that the mistakes or corruption of leaders can’t undermine or destroy the project. They have to be democratic to resist being co-opted. Proximity to power is intoxicating, and only an engaged and empowered membership can be the designated drivers who can snatch the keys away from distant leadership.
Still, mass movements have to be informed and led by cadres who were themselves changed through class struggle, whether against bosses, landlords, or arms of the oppressive state. Leadership requires “mobilizing” — putting members into motion in class struggle in order to both change the world and change themselves. So mobilization is also an essential part of the project of building a durable mass movement.
The mobilizations we prioritize have to be democratically developed and carefully chosen. They can’t just be anything; they should come up from members’ experiences, molded with more experienced comrades, and include political education to help members understand why they are experiencing what they are experiencing and give it a broader meaning. Mobilizations should be easy to access for busy people without being empty of political content or requiring little active participation.
That is the virtuous cycle of building a durable, democratic mass movement in organization. Putting people into strategic motion to sharpen their class consciousness analysis of the world; developing them into cadre political leadership; bringing their fellow members along with them; and so having socialist outcomes to democratic processes. This virtuous cycle contrasts with focus on campaign models that gained popularity in professional movement NGOs since the 2010-11 uprisings in the US.
The “Momentum Model” was Made for Grant Cycles
Sunrise, like many progressive nonprofit organizations and coalitions over the last decade, has in its lineage something called the Momentum Model, an organizing “community” that developed the “Momentum Living Model,” an approach to progressive or “social movement” organizing. For a number of years this model was widely adopted. If you’ve come across “train the trainers” or “campaign in a box” style of organizing approaches, then you’re somewhat familiar with it. Momentum cites Justice Democrats, IfNotNow, and Sunrise as three of its successes.
The model is a bit difficult to explain in plain language or concrete terms. There is a lot of organizer-speak in the formal explanation on their website, but in short, the Momentum Model seeks to fuse mass protest direct action with “structure-based organizing,” a generalized term for what is essentially Alinskyite organizing.
Mass protest is clear enough: minimal structure and leadership, appeals to the general public, and putting as many people on the streets as possible. Mass protest relies on moments of public and community outrage, combined with charismatic leadership and deployment of forms of communication, like local press, radio, church pulpits, social media networks, etc.
Alinskyite community organizing, of which ACORN is the most successful example, is the local and issue-focused work of building small organizational “bases” in contained areas where there can be a relative advantage for a base of well-organized people. Alinskyite community organizing relies on paid organizers who develop organizational (not political) “leaders,” who in turn cultivate volunteers or activists. Staff is necessary because the work is very intensive and incremental. Small wins prove the value of the organization, which helps develop more leaders and recruit more activists etc.
The Momentum Model “hybridizes” these two approaches into a “cycle” (this cycle isn’t quite described as being sequential): “escalation,” where people engage in mass nonviolent action (like the summer 2020 uprisings against police violence); then “absorption,” where these newly activated people are “brought into the movement,” which means directing people looking for political direction towards “asks” or simple tasks–another way to say “mobilizing.” This is a quote: “Absorption can mean new people signing an online petition, joining a mass call, or attending an orientation training.” Note the examples used.
It goes on: “Good absorption doesn’t just move people onto a ladder of engagement — it puts them on an elevator of engagement so that the most enthusiastic new leaders can step into high levels of responsibility quickly.” It is unclear what the practical difference between a “ladder of engagement” and “elevator of engagement” is, unless it is meant to suggest that whereas a ladder requires the person climbing it to put in effort, an elevator allows people to passively move upwards. (Note, the Momentum Community website has recently become private, thus the lack of links).
After “escalation” and “absorption” comes “active popular support,” which seems to be the articulation of specific demands on power (“defund the police”), which after being made can both “absorb” people and contribute to “escalation” into mass protest or direct action.
Whether the Momentum Model is good, or works, is not really the point. Clearly it has been effective sometimes and less effective at other times. This isn’t a wholesale critique of that model. What is interesting for us is that the Momentum “cycle” is not a model for building a democratic, mass organization. The words “democratic” and “democracy” do not appear anywhere in the thousands of words describing the Momentum Model.
It is a model for building campaigns. It developed in a material system where metrics and engagement are critical to getting grant funding; campaigns show good metrics through “engagement,” (“volunteers sent one million texts”). That can certainly be effective for building an organization. The more effective your organization is (or looks) the more easily money will flow into the organization, whether from major foundations or from other types of “partners,” like large progressive unions, who see it as a viable partner on a particular issue.
But just because campaign engagement metrics impress funders and influential progressive leaders, that does not mean it will bring masses of people into it in a sustained way that will keep them engaged and committed to the organization for years.
The Work is Important but Needs Meaning
Obviously a political organization has to do things–it has to run campaigns, it has to show that it can be effective and win things. But winning campaigns is not the same as building a resilient and democratic organization. To the contrary, a rapid cycle of campaigns that rely on intense staff involvement and reliance on a “core” of super-activists can be a recipe for burn-out, disappointment, and, importantly, frustration with the speed of decision-making that excludes deliberative and collective decision-making. Deliberation and decision-making have to work, together with the experience of struggle in campaigns to change a person and win their loyalty for a lifetime. That forms a strong foundation that makes a movement and an organization difficult to destroy.
Socialists shouldn’t idealize democracy or confuse “meetings” with “organizing.” But we should deeply connect the two things. Deliberative democracy and organizing activity have to be so deeply entwined with each other that they cannot be separated. Members have to, to the maximum degree possible, feel that they are the collective owners of the organization. Organizations should strive for bigness; should try to break out of the “anti-politics” of parochial localism; and should build for resiliency and durability, even when it is less exciting than a short-term win or the allure of proximity to power.
